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INTRODUCTION		
	
Special	Forum	on	Brexit		
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As	part	of	initial	campaigning	in	January	2013,	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	pledged	
to	hold	an	in/out	referendum	if	the	Conservatives	won	a	majority	in	the	general	election	
of	 2015.i	 Received	wisdom	before	 the	 2015	 general	 election	was	 that	 there	would	 be	
another	 coalition	 government,	 and	 that	 a	 Liberal	 Democrat	 Party	 partner	 to	 such	 a	
coalition	would	reject	a	 referendum;	so	centrist	Conservatives	could	make	 the	pledge,	
benefit	from	it,	and	likely	never	have	to	implement	it.	Thereafter,	the	intent	was	to	both	
undercut	 the	 growing	 popularity	 of	 the	 UK	 Independence	 Party	 (UKIP)	 and	 silence	
Cameron’s	 own	 Conservative	 sceptics.	 European	 integration	 had	 been	 a	 source	 of	
division	within	 the	Party,	particularly	 from	the	1990s,	based	on	 issues	 that	had	never	
been	resolved.	These	focused	mainly	on	the	sharing	of	sovereignty	within	the	European	
Union	(EU)	through	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1992	and	then	the	Lisbon	Treaty	in	2007.		
The	 immediate	 effect	 of	 a	 referendum	 pledge	 was	 to	 focus	 debate	 on	
immigration,	and	provide	a	degree	of	legitimacy	to	UKIP	and	a	point	of	convergence	for	
Conservative	sceptics.	 In	reality,	 immigration	and	EU	membership	are	 largely	separate	
issues.	It	has	been	typical	ever	since	the	UK	joined	the	European	Economic	Community	
in	1973	for	annual	net	migration	to	the	UK	from	outside	the	region	to	exceed	that	from	
within.	What	matters	 in	UK	politics	 is	 that	UKIP	 increased	 their	vote	 from	 less	 than	1	
million	to	3.8	million	in	the	2015	general	election.	In	essence,	in	attempting	to	confront	
the	 problem	 of	 the	 Euro‐sceptic	 right,	 Cameron	 put	 short‐term	 strategy	 for	 his	 own	
party	before	long‐term	collective	interests.	He	thus	contributed	to	shifting	the	‘Overton	
window’—the	range	of	ideas	that	can	assume	the	centre	stage	in	political	discourse	by	
being	 acceptable	 to	 the	 public—to	 accommodate	 the	 sceptics	 and	 UKIP’s	 way	 of	
positioning	a	much	broader	set	of	issues.	Obviously,	this	shift	also	affected	the	outcome	
of	the	referendum	in	June	2016.		
It	is	important,	however,	to	take	a	longer	term	and	wider	view	to	Brexit	and	its	
consequences.	Events	and	episodes	occur	within	processes.	A	number	of	processes	may	
not	only	occur	 simultaneously	but	also	 coalesce	and	 interact	 in	various	ways.	Already	
Thucydides,	 in	his	Peloponnesian	wars,	understood	the	difference	between	events	and	
underlying	 structures	 and	 processes.	 Thus,	 Thucydides	 distinguished	 between	 two	
types	of	causes,	between	aitia	and	prophasis.	Aitia	refers	to	the	rationalization	of	action,	
and	prophasis	to	the	underlying	causes,	to	the	causes	which	are	‘behind’	or	‘under’	the	
level	of	rationalizations	and	concrete	events	(see,	for	instance,	Edmunds,	1975,	pp.	172–
173).	The	‘going	beyond’	of	rationalization	can	be	done	in	at	least	three	directions.	The	
first	 direction	 is	 to	 move	 deeper	 into	 the	 discursive	 formations	 and	 meanings,	 for	
instance,	 by	 explicating	 the	 meaning	 structures	 underpinning	 a	 particular	 political	
stand,	for	example,	in	relation	to	the	EU.		
The	 second	 direction	 is	 to	 explain	 the	 concrete	 contextual	 and	 relational	
possibilities	 open	 to	 a	 positioned	 actor.	 A	 telling	 example	 is	 Cameron’s	 apparent	
opportunity	 to	 increase	 his	 party’s	 popularity	 by	 calling	 for	 a	 referendum.	 This	
opportunity	was	made	 possible	 by	 the	 underlying	 institutions	 (such	 as	 parliamentary	
democracy,	voting	system,	laws	concerning	referendum,	article	50	of	the	Lisbon	Treaty)	
and	the	specific	constellation	of	 forces	and	developments	pre‐	ceding	the	call	 (such	as	
continuous	disputes	about	financial	taxes	and	regulation	as	well	as	over	the	future	of	the	
City	of	London,	and	the	rise	of	UKIP	and	related	ideas	across	parties).		
The	third	direction	of	going	beyond	mere	rationalization	is	to	analyse	causal	or	
existential,	often	unintended	consequences	of	action,	involving	effects	of	power.	Actors	
do	 not	 always	 know	what	 they	 are	 doing	 does	 in	 terms	 of	 underlying	 structures	 and	
processes.	Moreover,	 systemic	 intra‐	 and	 inter‐dependence	may	give	 rise	 to	 emergent	
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powers	 and	 properties,	 which	 are	 (re)produced	 in	 the	 context	 of	 at	 least	 some	
unintended	consequences	of	action.	Brexit	may,	for	instance,	constitute	a	turning	point	
in	the	European	integration	process	and,	beyond	that,	in	the	processes	of	global	political	
economy	 and	 security.	 To	 use	 Alexander	 Wendt’s	 (1999)	 categories,	 the	 prevailing	
culture	of	anarchy	may	further	shift	from	Kantian	and	Lockean	understandings	towards	
Hobbesian	understandings.ii		
This	special	 forum	consists	of	10	contributions	 that	shed	 light	on	 the	aitia	and	
prophasis	of	Brexit.	Owen	Worth	starts	by	delving	deeper	into	the	discursive	formations	
and	meanings	of	neoliberalism.	He	argues	that	the	roots	of	the	successful	Brexit	vote	can	
be	 found	 in	 the	 free	 market	 purity	 that	 was	 implicit	 within	 the	 ideals	 behind	
Thatcherism.	 While	 the	 libertarian	 right	 can	 lay	 claim	 to	 have	 been	 the	 ideological	
victors	of	Brexit,	the	reality	within	British	society	has	been	that	of	increasing	cleavages,	
stimulating	 right‐wing	 reactionary	 forces	 (but	 also	 Jeremy	 Corbyn’s	 precarious	 rise	
within	the	Labour	Party).	Worth	concurs	with	Karl	Polanyi	that	free	market	 liberalism	
tends	to	generate	the	forces	of	its	own	demise.	This	seems	to	indicate	a	new	Polanyian	
double	movement	(cf.	Patomäki,	2014).		
Boris	Kagarlitsky	agrees	with	Worth’s	analysis	of	the	structural	developments	of	
British	 society,	 but	 takes	 a	 different	 viewpoint	 on	Brexit.	He	 points	 out	 that	 statistics	
show	 that	 the	 division	 of	 the	 Brexit	 vote	 does	 not	 coincide	 with	 racial	 or	 gender	
differences,	 but	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 reflects	 the	 difference	 in	 class.	 It	 was	 mainly	 the	
working	 class	 and	 the	 lower	 classes	 of	 society	 who	 voted	 for	 an	 exit	 from	 the	 EU.	
Kagarlitsky	 criticizes	 not	 only	 the	 neoliberal	 elites	 but	 also	 the	 Left	 intellectuals	 and	
cultural	critics	of	capitalism	for	failing	to	address	the	concerns	of	ordinary	citizens	and	
for	misrepresenting	the	‘Leave’	vote.	‘The	very	idea	that	masses	of	common	people	make	
their	choice	rationally,	according	to	their	real	interests,	is	totally	unacceptable	for	them.’	
He	argues	further	that	the	role	of	intellectuals	in	popular	movements	should	be	to	help	
people	over‐	come	these	prejudices,	to	move	from	an	intuitive	sense	of	their	interest	to	a	
conscious	 understanding.	 Supportive	 of	 Lexit	 (Left	 exit	 from	 the	 EU),	 Kagarlitsky	
declares	 that	 ‘the	 English	 voters	 expressed	 new	 pan‐European	 trends	 and	 needs	 (in	
their	best	and	worst	manifestations)’.		
Jamie	Morgan	warns,	however,	‘to	be	careful	what	you	wish	for’.	He	stresses	the	
relative	 openness	 of	 the	 immediate	 future.	 The	 British	 future	 from	 Brexit	 is	 not	 yet	
determined	 because	 its	 institutional	 form	 remains	 undecided.	 However,	 if	 dominant	
conceptual	frameworks	continue	to	apply,	then	it	seems	unlikely	that	Brexit	will	address	
the	 underlying	 causes	 of	 grievances,	 since	 these	 transcend	 EU	 membership.	 Morgan	
argues	 that	 they	 are	 a	 product	 of	 a	 common	 political	 economy,	 understood	 as	 an	
ideational	 framework	 within	 globalizing	 processes.	 A	 significant	 commonality	 in	
globalization	is	that	labour	is	treated	as	just	one	more	factor	of	production,	a	unit	cost,	
measured	 and	 rewarded	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 marginal	 productivity,	 and	where	 the	 labour	
market	 is	 ultimately	 no	 different	 from	 any	 other.	 The	 prevailing	 economic	 policy	
suppresses	 social	 and	 organized	 elements	 in	 labour	markets	 and	work	 organizations.	
This	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 decline	 of	 trust	 among	 citizenry.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 his	 piece,	
Morgan	 raises	 the	 question	whether	 all	 this	 could	 be	 understood	 also	 in	 terms	of	 the	
nowadays	 unfashionable	 concept	 of	 alienation.	 Alienation	 expresses	 itself	 as	 a	 deep	
sense	 of	 inauthenticity,	 a	 lack	 of	 self‐worth	 or	 existential	meaninglessness,	where	 the	
actual	potentials	of	the	human	are	somehow	being	harmed	by	the	system	we	live	in.		
Ann	Pettifor	also	takes	up	the	theme	of	the	role	of	economics	in	creating	context	
for	 Brexit.	 Pettifor’s	 focus	 is	 the	 role	 financialisation	 has	 played	 in	 creating	 the	
dissatisfactions	that	motivated	much	of	the	leave	vote.	Following	Polanyi	she	describes	
this	as	‘a	form	of	social	self‐protection	from	self‐regulating	markets	in	money,	trade	and	
labour’.	As	 she	 concludes,	 the	underlying	processes	 involved	 are	not	new	and	 are	not	
restricted	 to	 the	 UK.	 Noah	 Toly	 provides	 an	 additional	 perspective	 focusing	 on	 the	
concept	 of	 the	 global	 city	 and	 the	 considerable	 ‘leadership’	 challenges	 this	 creates	 for	
London	to	transform	itself	in	response	to	Brexit.		
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Bob	 Jessop	 analyses	 the	 organic	 crisis	 of	 the	 British	 state,	 explicitly	making	 a	
distinction	between	events	and	processes.	His	point	of	departure	is	that	the	Brexit	vote	
was	a	 singular	 event	 that	 is	 one	 symptom	of	 a	 continuing	organic	 crisis	 of	 the	British	
state.		
	
The	 Brexit	 conjuncture	 reflected	 a	 long‐running	 split	 in	 the	 establishment,	 a	
worsening	 representational	 crisis	 in	 the	 party	 system,	 a	 growing	 crisis	 of	
authority	 for	 political	 elites,	 a	 legitimacy	 crisis	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 a	 crisis	 of	
national‐popular	hegemony	over	the	population.		
	
These	crises	cannot	be	traced	back	to	a	single	process	or	level	of	causation,	yet	political	
economy	 can	 provide	 a	 key	 to	 understanding	 many	 aspects	 of	 the	 relevant	 complex.	
Jessop	 underlines	 that	 finance‐led	 neoliberal	 policies	 ‘privilege	 opportunities	 for	
monetary	profit	over	the	provision	of	substantive	use‐values’.	In	the	process,	wealth	and	
income	 have	 become	 polarized	 and	 social	 cohesion	 degraded.	 These	 policies	 fuel	 de‐
industrialization	and	generate	financial	crises	in	the	worldwide	context	characterized	by	
the	Euro	crisis,	economic	migration	and	refugee	crises,	and,	beyond	Europe,	the	shift	of	
the	global	centre	of	economic	gravity	to	East	Asia.	Jessop	concurs	that	‘a	choice	for	entry	
or	exit	would	not	affect	 the	overall	dominance	of	neoliberalism—only	its	specific	 form	
and	mediations’.	But	he	also	argues	for	‘pursuing	an	offensive	strategy	for	fundamental	
reform	of	the	European	Union	and	its	place	within	a	world	society’.		
Jo	Guldi	uses	her	knowledge	of	history	to	seek	guidance	for	the	future.	She	asks:	
‘How	likely	are	utopian	futures	of	the	kind	that	Jeremy	Corbyn	has	recently	envisioned	
for	the	future	of	post‐	Brexit	Britain?’	In	contrast	to	Morgan	and	Jessop,	who	anticipate	
neoliberal	business‐as‐usual	 in	 the	post‐Brexit	UK	(without	 implying	that	 there	are	no	
alternatives	 to	 it),	 Guldi	 explores	 the	 chances	 of	 implementing	 a	 10‐point	 plan	 for	
restoring	 the	 National	 Health	 Service	 (NHS),	 building	 homes,	 and	 reducing	 income	
inequality.	‘A	deeper	history	of	state,	democracy,	and	expert	rule	in	Brexit	can	highlight	
the	underlying	tensions	and	point	to	some	sources	of	possible	out‐	comes.’	Resonating	
with	Morgan’s	 analysis	 of	 ideational	 commonalities,	 Guldi	 is	 particularly	 interested	 in	
the	role	of	expert	power	in	government	since	the	eighteenth	century,	and	in	democratic	
alternatives	 to	 the	 dominant	 modes	 of	 expert	 knowledge	 such	 as	 neoclassical	
economics.	Manifold	utopian	 ideas	have	 emerged	at	 times	 in	British	history.	Although	
only	a	limited	number	of	these	ideas	were	ever	actually	put	into	effect,	history	provides	
a	rich	source	of	knowledge	about	democratic	and	participatory	ideas	and	experiments.	
Although	 dystopian	 futures	 are	 also	 possible,	 Guldi	 stresses	 the	 positive	 potentials	 of	
still	partly	unrealized	possibilities.		
Peter	Wahl	looks	at	Brexit	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	future	of	the	European	
integration	process.	 ‘The	Brexit	has	put	the	question	of	 the	 final	goal	of	 integration	on	
the	 agenda.’	 The	 logic	 of	 thinking	 has	 been	 mostly	 binary:	 either	 Eurotopia	 or	
nationalism.	 Wahl	 maintains	 that	 the	 ‘more	 Europe’‐approach	 is	 unrealistic	 for	 the	
foreseeable	future.	In	addition,	he	is	also	sceptical	of	its	normative	desirability,	at	least	
in	 its	current	neoliberal	 form.	On	the	other	hand,	Wahl	emphasizes	that	nationalism	is	
an	illusion	that	is	potentially	dangerous.	The	full	disintegration	of	the	Union	would	also	
be	very	costly.	This	can	be	generalized	 to	globalization.	 ‘It	 is	not	possible	any	more	 to	
disconnect	from	globalisation	and	the	attempt	to	return	back	to	the	old	style	of	nation‐
state	 is	 doomed	 to	 fail.’	 Thus,	 Wahl	 proposes	 a	 third	 way	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 EU.	
‘Differentiated	integration’	 is	characterized	by	two	principles:	flexibilization	within	the	
EU	 and	 opening	 towards	 the	 outside	 world.	 It	 would	 mean	 selective	 integration	 in	
certain	areas	and	disintegration	 in	certain	others,	both	with	variable	participation.	He	
takes	up	the	example	of	 the	 financial	 transaction	 tax	 to	show	what	 this	could	mean	 in	
practice—and	not	necessarily	in	Europe	only,	but	globally.		
James	Galbraith	alerts	us	to	the	dangers	of	prediction.		
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In	the	immediate	morning‐after	of	the	Brexit	vote,	the	wide	expectation	was	for	
economic	chaos,	a	government	of	Leavers	in	Britain	and	a	quick	filing	of	Article	
50,	 encouraged	by	 the	French,	 leading	 inexorably	 to	Britain’s	 exit	 from	 the	EU	
under	harsh	conditions	and	to	Scotland’s	exit	from	the	UK.		
	
In	fact,	the	British	exit	from	the	EU	is	postponed,	a	mixed	government	of	Conservatives	
has	 emerged	 and	 the	 London	 stock	 exchange	 recovered	 rapidly.	 ‘The	main	 economic	
consequence	was	a	drop	in	Sterling,	good	for	the	FTSE	100	Index	and	potentially	for	the	
trade	balance.’	Hence,	Galbraith’s	main	point	is	about	the	EU	as	a	whole.	Can	the	Euro	or	
the	 EU	 itself	 survive?	 ‘Clearly	 under	 present	 policies	 [the	 Euro]	 will	 not	 survive	
indefinitely.’	 The	 current	 fragile	 hope	 for	 Europe	 lies	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 construct	 a	 pan‐
European	 democratic	 and	 social‐	 democratic	 alliance.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 progressive	
European	transformations,	also	the	prospects	for	global	peace	and	security	are	going	to	
diminish.		
In	 the	 last	piece	of	 the	Forum,	Heikki	Patomäki	 asks	whether	 it	 is	 indeed	 true	
that	 either	 the	 EU	 will	 be	 democratized	 or	 it	 will	 disintegrate?	 Furthermore,	 if	 the	
current	 policies,	 principles	 and	 institutions	 of	 the	 EU	 generate	 counterproductive	
politico‐economic	 effects	 and	 suffer	 from	 problems	 of	 legitimation,	 why	 is	 it	 that	 the	
European	 discontent	 is	 channelled,	 for	 such	 a	 large	 part,	 into	 nationalist	 politics	 of	
othering	and	scapegoating	rather	than	into	building	a	 leftist‐democratic	movement	for	
transforming	 the	 Union?	 Collective	 learning	 points	 towards	 the	 gradual	 spread	 of	
democratic	 and	 cosmopolitan	 sentiments,	 but	 the	 difficulties	 of	 learning	 and	 a	 two‐
phase	 causal	 mechanism	 from	 economic	 trouble,	 via	 existential	 insecurities	 and	
anxieties	 in	 everyday	 lives,	 to	 securitization	 and	 enemy‐construction,	 explain	 why	
contrary	 tendencies	 may	 dominate.	 Trust	 in	 the	 EU	 has	 declined,	 in	 part	 due	 to	 a	
prolonged	economic	downturn	and	crisis	(with	deep	roots	in	the	global	financialization	
process),	 but	 in	 part	 because	 of	 what	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 the	 undemocratic	 or	
unchangeable	nature	of	the	EU.	Problems	of	 identity	politics,	securitization	and	enemy	
construction	 are	 not	 confined	 to	 Europe.	 They	 give	 rise	 to	 tendencies	 towards	
disintegration	 and	 conflicts,	 also	worldwide.	 Patomäki	 concludes	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	
modest	policy	proposals	 and	 tentative	 steps	within	 the	 existing	EU	Treaty	 framework	
may	 be	 too	 little	 too	 late.	 The	 question	 is	 whether	 there	 is	 enough	 time	 for	 deeper	
transformations	in	Europe—and	also	globally.		
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1.	 Initial	reference	by	 the	Conservatives	 to	a	variety	of	referendum	predates	2013	and	
can	be	found	in	the	2010	general	election	manifesto	(as	a	commitment	to	do	nothing	to	
augment	EU	powers	without	a	referendum).	In	the	2010	election,	UKIP	received	just	3%	
of	 the	vote,	but	by	2013,	polls	 indicated	that	they	had	around	15%	support,	and	could	
thus	contest	Conservative	marginal	seats.	This	then	gave	Conservative	MPs	a	reason	to	
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support	 a	 referendum	pledge,	 since	 it	 provided	a	 campaign	 focus	–	 ‘vote	Conservative	
and	 we	 will	 deliver	 on	 the	 EU,	 a	 vote	 for	 UKIP	 cannot	 do	 this’	 (as	 such	 the	 pledge	
broadened	 the	 appeal	 of	 an	 EU	 referendum	 beyond	 actual	 Euro‐sceptics).	 Cameron’s	
actual	 speech	 is	 a	 nuanced	 account	 of	 the	 need	 to	make	 the	 EU	more	 democratically	
accountable	and	 to	give	 its	members/citizens	a	 sense	of	 commitment	and	voice	 in	 the	
wake	 of	 growing	 scepticism	 in	 a	 period	 of	 austerity	 politics,	 and	 so	 on.	 However,	 the	
media	reports	focus	almost	exclusively	on	the	significance	of	the	pledge	as	a	response	to	
Conservative	Euro‐sceptics.		
	
2.	According	to	Wendt	(1999),	 the	cultures	of	 inter‐state	anarchy	(meaning	there	 is	no	
world	 state)	 are	 shared	 ideas,	 which	 help	 shape	 state	 interests	 and	 capabilities,	 and	
generate	 tendencies	 in	 the	 international	 system.	 A	 Hobbesian	 culture	 is	 premised	 on	
unrestrained	egoism	and	consequent	war	of	all	against	all.	In	a	Lockean	culture,	egoism	
is	restrained,	 law	and	others	are	recognized,	and	cooperation	and	common	institutions	
are	more	likely.	 In	a	Kantian	culture,	ethics	and	law	matter	even	more,	security	can	be	
collective	and	institutions	of	cooperation	extensive	and	intensive.	In	Hobbesian	cultures,	
the	main	subject	position	is	‘enemy’,	in	Lockean	‘rival’,	and	in	Kantian	‘friend’.		
	
